Ronnie Johnson v. Michael Wenerowicz by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-29-2011 
Ronnie Johnson v. Michael Wenerowicz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Ronnie Johnson v. Michael Wenerowicz" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 756. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/756 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-243           NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2248 
 ___________ 
 
 RONNIE E. JOHNSON, 
Sui Juris, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPT. MICHAEL WENEROWICZ; 
DEPUTY SUPT. MICHEAL LORENZO; 
GARY OLINGER, Correctional Classification Program Manager; 
DAN WHITE, Lieutenant, sued in their individual and official capacity  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal From the United States District Court 
 For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 10-cv-05027) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  July 29, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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Appellant, Ronnie Johnson, appeals the District Court=s order dismissing his pro se 
First Amended and Supplemental Complaint (“amended complaint”).  Upon 
consideration of the record, we conclude that the District Court properly determined that 
Johnson’s claims were subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Therefore, 
because the appeal presents no arguable issues of fact or law, we will dismiss it pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for essentially the same reasons set forth in the thorough 
Memorandum Opinion of the District Court. 
In September 2010, Johnson initiated a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
that various employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (ADOC@) violated 
his federal and state rights.  More specifically, Johnson alleged that DOC defendants’ 
decision to house him in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) at the State Correctional 
Institution at Graterford (“SCI-Graterford”) violated his due process rights, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and the Pennsylvania constitution and state statutes.  
Named as defendants in both their individual and official capacities were the following 
DOC employees from SCI-Graterford:  Superintendent Michael Wenerowicz; Deputy 
Superintendent for Facilities Management Michael Lorenzo; Correctional Classification 
Program Manager Gary Olinger; and Lieutenant Dan White from the J Block of the SMU. 
Johnson, who is currently incarcerated at SCI-Fayette, asserted that the DOC 
3 
 
defendants first violated his due process rights on May 26, 2010, when defendants White 
and Olinger placed him in the SMU at Graterford after a Program Review Committee 
(“PRC”) hearing without having indicated a proper reason for their decision on a form 
called a DC-141, Part IV.  Johnson appealed the PRC’s decision claiming a procedural 
violation as well as discrimination on the part of defendant White, who allegedly has a 
bias against him.  Citing to DOC policies DC-ADM 801 and 802, Superintendent 
Wenerowicz denied Johnson’s appeal of that decision on June 7, 2010.  Johnson’s 
subsequent appeal to Chief Hearing Examiner Robert B. McIntyre was likewise denied on 
June 16, 2010. 
A second due process violation is alleged to have occurred on August 18, 2010, 
when defendants Lorenzo and Olinger decided at Johnson’s PRC hearing that he should 
remain in the SMU, but failed to provide him with a DC-141, Part IV.  This deficiency 
apparently caused Wenerowicz to grant Johnson another PCR hearing.  That hearing took 
place on September 17, 2010, before Major Francis Fields and defendants White and 
Olinger.  Johnson asserts that the DOC defendants once again failed to “establish a 
substantiated reason” for their decision to continue his placement in the SMU.  Johnson 
was transferred to SCI-Fayette on October 12, 2010, and claims to have still not received 
a DC-141, Part IV, regarding the PRC’s decision to keep him housed in the SMU.  
Johnson sought injunctive, declaratory and compensatory relief, as well as punitive 
damages. 
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The DOC defendants responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss filed 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on 
April 13, 2011, the District Court granted defendants= Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed 
the amended complaint.  This timely appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and review de novo the District 
Court=s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  See Lora-Pena v. F.B.I., 529 F.3d 503, 505 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  We accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint and draw 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 
93-94 (2007) (per curiam).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, B U.S. B , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (complainant 
must “provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief [with] more than labels and 
conclusions . . ..”).  Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with the District 
Court’s disposition of Johnson’s claims and do not hesitate to conclude that the District 
Court properly dismissed his amended complaint. 
As the District Court correctly determined, Johnson’s requests for injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the named DOC defendants were rendered moot by his transfer 
to SCI-Fayette, especially given the absence of any indication that he will once again be 
confined at SCI-Graterford.  See Sutton v. Rasheed,  323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003) 
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(citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975), and Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 
195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)) (“An inmate’s transfer from the facility complained of generally 
moots the equitable and declaratory claims.”). 
We further agree with the District Court=s conclusion that the Eleventh 
Amendment affords the DOC defendants protection from suit in their official capacities.  
Under the Eleventh Amendment, states and state agencies are immune from suit for 
monetary damages in federal court.  See, e.g., P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf 
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).  Because the Pennsylvania DOC is a part of the 
executive department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, its employees share in the 
Commonwealth=s Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent that they were sued in 
their official capacities.  See Will v. Mich. Dep=t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); 
see also Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).  As we have 
previously noted, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its rights under the 
Eleventh Amendment.  See Lavia, 224 F.3d at 195; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. ‘ 8521(b). 
To the extent the DOC defendants were sued in their individual capacities, the 
District Court was correct to conclude that Johnson failed to state a claim for relief with 
respect to his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims as they related to his 
confinement in the SMU.  While states “may under certain circumstances create liberty 
interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 
472, 484 (1995), such interests are generally limited to “freedom from restraint which . . . 
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imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life.”  Id.  We can find no fault with the District Court’s conclusion 
that Johnson’s transfer to the SMU for a five month period – even if he was transferred 
there without having received a copy of the DC-141, Part IV – did not implicate a 
protected liberty interest.  See, e.g., Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(confinement in administrative custody for fifteen months not atypical or significant 
deprivation).  Johnson thus failed to demonstrate a due process violation.  Likewise, 
because Johnson has not alleged that he was denied any basic human need, that he was 
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” or that prison 
officials demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety while he was 
housed in the SMU, he fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.  See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also 
Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709.   
Finally, we find that Johnson’s Equal Protection claim is without merit for the 
reasons set forth in the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and dispose of it without 
further discussion.  Having dismissed all of Johnson’s claims over which it had original 
jurisdiction, the District Court acted within its discretion in declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 
Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009). 
Accordingly, because the appeal lacks merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 323 (1989). 
